This Study investigates the Relationship between corporate governance and earning Quality the listed companies in Tehran stock exchange, over the period of 2002 through 2008. In this study following Gov-Score developed by Brown and Caylor (2006), the corporate governance has investigated by using features of dual responsibility of CEO, board of directors independent, board of directors size, board of directors ownership, institutional investors ownership, auditor size, auditor tenure, CEO tenure and law merchant compliance. To determinate of earning Quality based on modified Jones (1991) model, used from absolute value of discretionary accruals. For test of hypothesis are used the variance analyse (ANOVA) and multiple linear regression and measurement method of Cross-sectional. We find evidence that there is no significant relationship between all of the features of corporate governance used in this study and earning Quality. Also, there is no significant Difference between earning Quality of companies with strong, medium and weak corporate governance.

Maximizing shareholder wealth, fulfilling ethical duties and social responsibilities can be considered as one of the most important goals of the company. One of the factors that has a significant impact on the realization of these goals is the proper implementation of the principles of corporate governance. In this study, the corporate governance mechanisms on the audit fee rate, the interruption of the audit report and the size of the auditor in the companies active in the Tehran Stock Exchange between 2009 and 2018, the results of which indicate that the variables of the size of the board of directors, managers Non-executive and audit committee effectiveness / number of meetings have a positive and significant effect on the audit fee rate, and the variables of the role dangers (CEO), auditor literacy of the audit committee managers, ownership concentration and type of business activity have a negative and significant effect on the audit fee rate. Also variables of non-executives, small size Audit and size of the company / total assets have a positive and significant effect on the audit report lag, and the variables of board size, role duality (CEO) and profitability of the company have a negative and significant effect on the audit report lag. Independence of the board of directors and the existence of the internal auditor of the effect Have a positive and significant impact on the size of the auditor.

Based on majority view in the management of public corporations, minority rights are less relevant and, in some cases, managers abuse their position. In this regard, solutions need to be provided to support minority shareholders. The American model of corporate governance system to protect the rights of minority shareholders includes "fair disclosure of financial information in both seasonal and annual reports, and the need for a disclosure committee to review and monitor reporting to supervisory bodies and the publication of dividends", "the need to get informed of the issues before the meeting and the possibility to submit a proposal to the general assembly by each of the shareholders in accordance with a number of precise procedures", "the necessity of forming a committee of candidates in each company and the possibility of filing a lawsuit" Designed by each of the shareholders against the offenders in the name of the company in the form of a derivative dispute Which is categorized into four categories of "information rights", "management rights", "control rights" and "procedural rights". In Iran's law, although there is no special law on the "corporate governance", but in various laws related to public corporations, such as the "Bill of Amendments to the Part of the Trade Law Act of 1347" And regulations and instructions related to the corporate governance, such as "Annual Reporting of Managers to the General Assembly", "Acquainting Stockholders with the Issues of the Meeting before the Holding", and "The possibility of filing a minimum installment of one fifth of shareholders for managers under a number of conditions". The present study is carried out with a comparative method and the collected data have been analyzed according to the legal provisions of the two legal systems studied. Identifying numerous deficiencies in mandatory legal provisions regarding minority rights in Iranian law, especially in the areas of "financial disclosure and transparency", "voting system" and "derivative action", including the findings and results of the present study. In each section, solutions and suggestions are provided.

Cash is one of the most cash assets in the balance sheet, in recent years the amount of cash holdings in financial literature has been considered greatly. The aim of this study is to investigate the effect of unconditional conservatism and corporate governance Quality such as CEO non-duality, independence of the board of directors, institutional investors, and strong corporate governance mechanisms on the level of cash holdings. A sample of 121 companies listed in Tehran Stock Exchange during the years of 2006 to 2016 participated in this study and in order to test the hypotheses, Multivariate linear regression was employed. The results of estimating research models show that unconditional conservatism has a significant negative effect on the level of cash holdings. On the other hand, CEO non-duality has no significant impact on the level of cash holdings. Also, the effects of independence of the board of directors, institutional investors and strong corporate governance on the level of cash holdings are positive and significant.

Objective: Nowadays Owners uses corporate governance mechanisms to reduce the opportunistic behavior of managers and decrease credit rating level. Accordingly, the purpose of this article is to review the effect of real earnings management on the relationship between corporate governance Quality and credit rating. Methods: In this research, the data of the 144 firms listed in the Tehran stock exchange for the period of 2010 to 2018 has been gathered and analyzed. To measure the credit rating we use Emerging Market Credit Scoring Model. Also, real earnings management measured by Roychowdhury model. Data obtained from Rahaward Novin software, firms financial statements and Codal system. Furthermore, to test the hypotheses of this research we utilized panel data approach and multiple regression model with GLS method. Results: The results show that the Quality of corporate governance has a negative influence on the real earnings management; In other words, the higher Quality of corporate governance decreases the opportunistic behavior of managers. In addition, the Quality of corporate governance has a positive effect on credit rating but it is not statistically significant. Also results show that the real earnings management has significant and negative effect on credit rates. Finally, the results of the sobel test indicate that real earnings management has mediating effects on relationship between corporate governance Quality and credit rates. Based on the results of research, the Quality of corporate governance has indirect effect on credit rating through real earnings management. In other words, the Quality of corporate governance through reducing opportunistic behavior of managers, leads to better credit rating. Conclusion: From the negative effect of real earnings management on credit rates, we can conclude that the manager uses real activities earnings management for their impulses which will be detrimental to the stakeholders. So, when manager manipulates accounting earnings by real activities earnings management, the information asymmetry between managers and stakeholders increases hereupon systematic risk of companies increased. To preserve the interests of all stakeholders, corporate governance mechanisms are used. The corporate governance mechanisms can decline information asymmetry hereupon decrease systematic risk of companies. By applying strong corporate governance mechanisms, the opportunistic behavior of managers would reduce. Since real activities earnings management increase the risk of the corporation, with applying strong corporate governance mechanisms, opportunistic behavior of managers reduced and credit rating increased. With this regards, we can conclude that, when managers supervised by the strong corporate governance mechanisms, the opportunistic behavior of them decreases. Thus information provided had less bias. Eventually, this leads to the correct decision making by market participants.

This paper examines the association between corporate governance mechanisms and the Quality of accounting earnings. It is discussed and predictable that suitable corporate governance mechanisms make financial reporting more observable and prevent it from low Quality. We investigate whether accrual Quality, earnings persistence and earnings predictability are affected by the corporate governance. Also, we consider three corporate governance variables: extent of independent (non executive) directors, board leadership, and the number of meetings. We test our hypothesis using a sample of 600 firm-year observations of Tehran Stock Exchange (150 firms during 2005-2008).The findings show that the increasing the number of non executive directors and board meetings strengthen the firm’s earning Quality (earnings persistence and its predictability). However, we find no relation between leadership structure and firms’ earnings Quality (again, earnings persistence and its predictability). Surprisingly, our results indicate that there is no significant relationship between corporate governance and accruals Quality as a measure for earnings Quality.